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We examine the Centros decision through the lens of SB 826 – the California statute mandating a 
minimum number of women on boards.  SB 826, like the Centros decision, raises questions about 
the scope of the internal affairs doctrine and its role in encouraging regulatory competition.  
Despite the claim that US corporate law is characterized by regulatory competition, in the US, the 
internal affairs doctrine has led to less variation in corporate law than in Europe.  We theorize 
that this is due to the shareholder primacy norm in US corporate law which results in the internal 
affairs doctrine focusing on matters of shareholder interest and, primarily, shareholder economic 
interest.  We argue that the internal affairs doctrine should be understood within the context of the 
shareholder primacy norm and therefore directed to rules oriented to enhancing firm economic 
value.  In contrast, EU corporate law has traditionally had broader stakeholder orientation.  We 
posit that the limited impact of the Centros decision, an impact which differed significantly from 
its predicted revolutionary effect, can be attributed to the greater focus of EU corporate law on 
social ordering and extra-shareholder interests. This difference leads to a new understanding of 
SB 826 as reflecting a move toward more EU-style governance focused on social ordering.  
Ironically, California’s adoption of SB 826 may portend a movement of the United States towards 
Centros-style governance. Under this analysis, we argue that SB 826 should not be viewed as 
inconsistent with the internal affairs doctrine since it involves social ordering rather than purely 
shareholder interests.  
 
Introduction 
 It has been twenty years since the European Court of Justice issued its decision in 
Centros.1  Since that time, Centros has been widely understood as shifting the European Union 
(EU) from the real seat doctrine, in which a corporation is governed by the corporate law of the 
country in which it is headquartered, to an era of increased corporate mobility.2  Specifically 
                                                 
* Jill Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School; Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law, at the University of California Berkeley, School of Law.   
1 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. 
2 See, e.g., Carney 2001, p. 718 n.5  (”For European Community members, the real seat rule appears to have been 
repealed in favor of the internal affairs rule by the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European 
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Centros, together with subsequent decisions, allowed EU corporations, by incorporating in 
another jurisdiction, to choose their governing corporate law deliberately.3  
We consider the Centros decision in the context of the current debate, in the United 
States, over the legitimacy of SB 826, the California statute mandating that public companies 
whose principal executive offices are located in California have a minimum number of female 
directors.4  California has previously attempted to resist the limitations of the internal affairs 
doctrine by imposing its corporate law on so-called foreign corporations, corporations that are 
incorporated outside the state but conduct the majority of their business in California.  The 
legitimacy of these attempts has been hotly contested and, indeed rejected by the Delaware 
courts.5  SB 826 is different from other aspects of California’s foreign corporation law, however, 
in that it applies exclusively to public companies and to all such companies that have their 
principal executive offices located within the state.  The extent to which California has the power 
to extend the reach of its corporate law this far is disputed, and at least one prominent 
commentator has already argued that SB 826 is invalid to the extent it applies to corporations 
that are not both chartered and headquartered in California.6 
SB 826 is somewhat distinctive from most US corporate law, however, in that it 
addresses a timely and controversial public policy issue – gender quotas for corporate boards.  
From the US perspective, corporate law is focused primarily on limiting managerial agency costs 
and maximizing shareholder value.  The connection between gender quotas and shareholder 
value remains unclear.  As such, SB 826 highlights the question of the degree to which the 
internal affairs doctrine is intertwined with the objective of shareholder value maximization and 
with, more generally, the principle of shareholder primacy.  Shareholder primacy has emerged as 
a dominant organizing principle of U.S. corporate law. 7 This enables the internal affairs doctrine 
to serve as a tool for economic ordering.   
Shareholder primacy reflects, to a large extent, a peculiarly US perspective.8  Most of the 
EU does not subscribe to shareholder primacy.  The interests of other stakeholders – creditors, 
employees and communities – play a more compelling role in EU company law.  One example is 
the protection of employee interests, in several EU countries, through codetermination.  Another 
is the proliferation of jurisdictions that have adopted legislation imposing gender quotas on 
                                                 
Communities, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 708 (Mar. 9 1999)”); Doré 
2014, p. 331 (observing that, although commentators initially debated the scope of the Centros decision, “there is 
now general agreement that the EU Treaty requires Member States to apply the internal affairs rule to companies 
organized in other European countries.”). 
3 Doré 2014, p. 221.   
4 Senate Bill 826. 
5 See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1110 n.1 (Del. 2005). 
6 See Grundfest 2018, p. 1 (arguing that, except with respect to 72 such corporations, SB 826 is unconstitutional 
“because of the internal affairs doctrine”). 
77 See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance §2.01 (1994). 
8 The UK also adheres the principal of shareholder primacy.  For a call to reconsider shareholder primacy and a 
claim that a corporation’s purpose should extend beyond profit maximization see The British Academy 2018. 
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corporate boards.9 We argue that the commitment by EU member states to these interests raises 
serious questions about the viable scope of US-style regulatory competition in Europe.   
SB 826 highlights the difference in orientation.  SB 826, which reflects a concern with 
broader societal goals such as discrimination and sexual harassment, can be understood as an 
effort to extend corporate law to issues beyond shareholder value maximization and to consider 
the type of stakeholder interests that play a greater role in the EU.  As such, the application of the 
internal affairs doctrine to SB 826 is, we argue, uncharted territory.  California was the first US 
state to adopt a mandatory gender quota, although several other states subsequently indicated a 
willingness to follow California’s lead.10   This development raises critical questions about the 
extent to which the US internal affairs doctrine constrains state regulatory power.  
In the case of SB 826, we argue that the shareholder primacy norm informs the validity of 
California’s actions.  We argue that because US corporate law focuses on principles of 
shareholder primacy, these principles offer a basis for limiting the scope of regulatory 
competition.11  Specifically, we claim that the internal affairs doctrine can be understood as 
limited to matters that are subject to internal ordering and relationships among the firm’s 
officers, directors and shareholders.  Under this rubric, pure matters of corporate governance are 
subject to the internal affairs doctrine while laws governing external interests are not. We argue 
that SB 826 falls within the latter category. 12 
These principles explain the effect of Centros and perhaps its future course.  Centros 
generated widespread concern that it would introduce US-style regulatory competition into the 
EU.  Although a significant number of corporations responded to the enhanced mobility provided 
by Centros, the decision primarily had the effect of narrowing the differences in capitalization 
requirements across Europe.  Corporations largely failed to use the freedom of incorporation to 
avoid other elements of their home county’s corporate law.   We argue that this result can be 
explained by the fact that regulatory competition, and the internal affairs doctrine which makes 
such competition possible, are focused on principles of economic ordering relating to 
shareholder value.  The broader range of objectives addressed by EU company law results in a 
deeper commitment to country-specific differences both at the political level and in the context 
of specific firm decisions, a commitment that is not readily undercut by freedom of 
establishment.  In this regard, the EU is unlikely to see substantial additional convergence in 
corporate law.  Indeed, as SB 826 portends, this reality may be coming to the United States and 
its own peculiar form of regulatory competition.  In other words, and ironically, while the past 
history of the internal affairs doctrine in the US partially explains Centros’ effects, the 
                                                 
9 See von Meyerinck, et al. 2019 (observing that Norway, “Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, 
and Spain have all established” mandatory gender quotas for corporate boards). 
10 On March 29, 2018, the Illinois House advanced a bill that would mandate both gender and racial diversity on 
corporate boards.  See Bainbridge 2019.  A pending bill in the New Jersey legislature would require public 
companies to have a minimum of three female directors on their boards. Vittorio 2018.   
11 See Fisch 2006. 
12 The statute may also be vulnerable under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Civil Rights 
Act.  See, e.g., Amar and Mazzone 2018 (discussing analysis under the Equal Protection Clause). This article does 
not address those issues. 
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limitations of the Centros decision in the EU may explain the future of the internal affairs 
doctrine in the United States.  
 
1. Centros and its progeny 
 
1.1 The Centros Trilogy 
 
 Until 1999, many countries in Europe adhered to the real seat doctrine, in which a 
corporation is governed by the law of the country in which its head office is located.13 In a trio of 
decisions starting with the 1999 Centros decision, the European Court of Justice held that the 
real seat doctrine cannot be used to deny recognition or apply domestic corporate law to a 
corporation that is validly formed in another EU member state. 14 This had the effect of 
recognizing the principle of free choice of incorporation.15 
 Centros involved Danish citizens who formed a U.K. corporation to avoid Denmark’s 
minimum capital requirements.  When they sought to register a branch office of the corporation 
to do business in Denmark, Denmark refused to register it.  The Court held that “the fact that a 
national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to form it in the Member 
State whose rules of company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in 
other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.”16     
Consequently, the Court concluded that Denmark was required to register Centros to do 
business.   
 Commentators initially questioned the scope of the Centros decision.17  As a result, the 
“death knell” of the real seat doctrine did not come until 2002, when the ECJ decided 
Überseering.18 Germans bought the stock of Überseering, a Dutch company, and moved its 
operations to Germany.  Subsequently, Überseering filed suit in Germany against Nordic, a 
German company.  The German court held that Überseering did not have the legal capacity to 
bring suit because Germany, a real seat country, required Überseering to reincorporate in 
Germany when it moved its operations there, and Überseering had not done so.  The ECJ 
disagreed, holding that articles 43 and 48 of the EU Treaty required both that Germany recognize 
Überseering as a valid Dutch corporation and uphold its right to bring suit in Germany. 
 The final decision of the trio repudiating the real seat doctrine was Inspire Art.19  Inspire 
Art was what amounts to a pseudo-foreign corporation, essentially a Dutch company that had 
                                                 
13 Other countries adhered to the incorporation doctrine, which applied the law of the country in which the business 
was incorporated. Gelter 2017. 
14 Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. 
I-9919. See Gelter 2017.  
15 Gelter 2017.  
16 Centros, ¶ 27. 
17 See, e.g., Gelter 2017.  
18 Id. 




been organized under U.K. law, ostensibly to avoid capital requirements imposed by Dutch 
corporate law.  Although the Netherlands did not adhere to the real seat doctrine and recognized 
foreign corporations, its company law took a similar approach to §2115 of the California statute 
and applied various components of its corporate law to pseudo-foreign corporations such as 
Inspire Art.20  
 The Netherlands defended its statute by arguing that it was nondiscriminatory and that it 
provided only minimal obligations necessary to protect those in the Netherlands who deal with 
corporations, whether foreign or domestic.  The ECJ was not persuaded.  It held first “that the 
fact that the company was formed in a particular Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying 
the benefit of more favourable legislation does not constitute abuse even if that company 
conducts its activities entirely or mainly in that second State.”21  Second, the ECJ concluded 
“that Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude national legislation such as the WFBV which imposes 
on the exercise of freedom of secondary establishment in that State by a company formed in 
accordance with the law of another Member State certain conditions provided for in domestic 
law in respect of company formation relating to minimum capital and directors' liability.”22 
 
1.2 The Impact of the Centros Trilogy 
 
 The result of the three decisions – Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art -- was to provide 
greater scope for corporations in the EU to select their state of incorporation and, through that 
selection, the applicable company law regime.  As one commentator explains, “It is no abuse of 
the freedom of establishment if the company founders select the law which best suits their needs 
even if, as a result, the company is established under a more permissible company law regime 
than the one prevailing at its real seat.” 23 
 Following the decisions, a number of commentators predicted that the decisions would 
lead to regulatory competition among EU nations akin to that in the United States.24  They 
further expressed the concern that this competition would lead to a race-to-the bottom as opposed 
                                                 
20 The applicable Dutch law was the Wetop de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen (Law on Formally Foreign 
Companies) (WFBV).  The “WFBV defines a formally foreign company as a capital company formed under laws 
other than those of the Netherlands and having legal personality, which carries on its activities entirely or almost 
entirely in the Netherlands and also does not have any real connection with the State within which the law under 
which the company was formed applies.”  Inspire Art ¶22.  The WFBV imposed various obligations on formally 
foreign companies including “obligations concerning the company's registration in the commercial register, an 
indication of that status in all the documents produced by it, the minimum share capital and the drawing-up, 
production and publication of the annual documents.”  Id. ¶23. 
21 Id. at ¶96. 
22 Id. at ¶105. 
23 Kieninger 2009, p. 609. 
24 See, e.g., Dammann 2004 p. 530 (“European corporations faced with the prospect of free choice are likely to 
reincorporate in one or a few Member States, and it is highly probable that one or more of the smaller Member 
States will emerge as the leading jurisdiction(s).”). 
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to no race or a race to the top.25  Other commentators argued that concerns about a race to the 
bottom were overstated, and that regulatory competition would likely be limited by a number of 
a factors such as the absence of any Member state with the characteristics to make it likely to 
emerge as a winner in the competition for corporate charters as well as the relatively greater 
importance of non-shareholder interests such as those of employees and banks.26 As Ron Gilson 
has observed: “the effect of Centros may be attenuated by responsive efforts by EC member 
states to impose restrictions in ways that cannot be avoided by instrumental choice of where to 
incorporate.”27 
 Over the twenty years since the Centros decision the greatest fears of commentators 
concerning Centros’ effect of creating a European “Delaware” failed to appear.28 Instead, 
Centros has mostly have leveling effects in corporate law.  In the immediate wake of Centros, 
Marco Becht, Colin Mayer, and Hannes Wagner found a substantial increase in the number of 
private limited companies from other EU Member States incorporating in England and Wales 
from 1997 to 2005, an increase that the authors attribute to the ECJ rulings.29 Most of the 
corporations that elected to incorporate outside of their real seat did so in an effort to avoid 
minimum capital requirements.30   
 In order to stem this flight risk, the major EU countries reformed their corporate law to 
reduce minimum capitalization requirements and to more generally conform basic corporate 
governance features with English law. 31  This corporate law reform was paired with a shift of 
creditor protection from corporate law to insolvency law, which allowed the forum state to 
reassert its interest in protecting local creditors.32  Luca Enriques and Martin Gelter term this 
“insolvencification.”33  The end result of these reforms was to stem reincorporation from the 
continent to the United Kingdom.  A subsequent study reports a significant decrease in migration 
of German firms to incorporate in the UK after 2006 and concludes that the migration observed 
by Becht et al. may merely have been a “flash in the pan.”34   
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Jankolovits 2004, p. 1004 (“[T]he holding in Centros may create a race for the bottom in Europe.”).  See 
generally Fisch 2000 (describing academic debate over whether regulatory competition results in a race to the 
bottom, a race to the top, or no race at all). 
26 See, e.g., Tröger 2005. 
27 Gilson, 2001. 
28 See, e.g., Gelter and Reif 2017, p. 1426 (observing that “the jurisdiction within the United Kingdom called 
‘England and Wales’ did not establish itself as the European Delaware”).  
29 Becht et al. 2008, p. 242.   
30 Incorporation choices were also the result of company-specific incorporation costs.  See Becht et al. 2008. 
31 See Ferran 2019 (observing that “the Centros decision . . . was a powerful catalyst for the dynamic dismantling of 
minimum capital requirements in national company laws”). 
32 Choice of law rules in insolvency law “more closely resemble the real seat doctrine.”  Bruner 2018.  See Kornhaas 
v. Dithmar, CJEU Case No. C-5941/14 [2016] (holding that the application of German national law regarding the 
reimbursement of dividend payments made by a director after insolvency is properly characterized as insolvency law 
rather than company law and, as a result, does not infringe freedom of establishment as applied to an English 
corporation operating in Germany).   
33 Enriques and Gelter 2007, pp. 600-602.   
34 Ringe 2013, p. 262. 
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 The limited effect of Centros is even more startling in that other, more defining (and 
arguably more burdensome) features of country-specific corporate law have failed to spur more 
corporate flight.35  Martin Gelter, for example, argued that corporations could use Centros to 
avoid Germany’s codetermination requirement.36  This fear initially appeared justified when, in 
2006, Air Berlin went public as a UK company in a move that was widely explained as an effort 
to avoid codetermination.37  Some commentators predicted that other corporations would follow 
Air Berlin’s lead, but this prediction failed to materialize.  Rather, Air Berlin was exceptional, 
and only a handful of other German companies incorporated outside of Germany to avoid 
codetermination.38   At the time, commentators also debated the legal question of whether issuers 
could even use regulatory competition to avoid codetermination.39 In the 25 years since the 
Centros decision, the ECJ has never addressed this question.40   
 Why did Centros not result in greater regulatory competition in Europe? 41 We argue that 
this question can be addressed, in part, by a better understanding of the true scope of regulatory 
competition in the United States, as effectuated through the internal affairs doctrine. 
  
2. Regulatory Competition in the United States 
 
2.1 The Origins of the U.S. Internal Affairs Doctrine 
 
The real seat doctrine has never been a feature of US law and thus there is no Centros-
like decision governing corporate mobility in the United States.  Rather, corporations in the US 
historically have been free to incorporate in the state of their choice and to have that state’s 
corporate law govern their affairs rather than the law of the state in which they conduct their 
operations.  The principle that allows this is known as the internal affairs doctrine which 
effectively allows corporations to choose their corporate law by determining in which state to 
incorporate.42   
                                                 
35 Dammann 2003, p. 613 (describing whether Germany would be able to keep codetermiation as “the single most 
relevant question in the wake of Centros”). 
36 Gelter 2018 (reasoning that “’regulatory competition’ on the US model could permit a German firm to shuck co-
determination and its two-tiered board via a simple merger with a UK shell set up for purpose of the merger”).   
37 See Wiesmann 2006.   
38 See Roth 2010 (stating that the Centros trio “has not produced any visible effect on German co-determination 
practice” and observing that, as of  2010, only 37 German companies incorporated or reincorporated outside of 
Germany to avoid codetermination and “The only major company incorporated as a public limited company (plc) is 
Germany′s second biggest airline, Air Berlin.”). 
39 See, e.g., Troger 2005 (“The explicitly ′political′ character of codetermination as a specific distributional 
settlement between corporate constituents makes it questionable whether a simple opt-out can be legitimised. 
Although freedom of choice in corporate law is generally granted, an opt-out from codetermination might be 
barred”). 
40 See Hodge 2010, p. 142 (observing that “the ECJ has never specifically addressed a case where freedom of 
establishment has been used to avoid codetermination”). 
41 Moreover, any such result is far less likely after Brexit.  See, e.g., Eidenmuller 2018 (arguing that Brexit will 
lessen regulatory competition by making it more difficult to choose UK law in the future). 
42 Ventoruzzo 2007. 
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Although the internal affairs doctrine is widely-cited as a major tenet of U.S. corporate 
law,43  it did not arise out of a deliberate policy decision to promote regulatory competition.  
Rather, it began as a tool that enabled each state’s legislature to exercise control over the 
regulation of local corporations.44   Courts perpetuated the internal affairs doctrine in the face of 
developing charter competition, largely as a response to interest group pressure and competition 
among states to retain local business operations, competition that would have been threatened by 
restrictive corporate law rules.45  The resulting so-called market for corporate law has led to what 
some commentators describe as regulatory competition.46  It has also spurred a debate about 
whether the U.S. is racing to the top or bottom in corporate law in terms of corporate law 
quality.47 
Both the scope of the internal affairs doctrine and its legal basis remain somewhat 
unclear.  Some commentators have taken the position that the doctrine is constitutionally 
compelled, finding constitutional foundations for the internal affairs doctrine in the Commerce 
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.48   Notably, the Delaware courts have asserted this 
claim powerfully.  For example, the Delaware Supreme Court in VantagePoint 49 stated that “The 
‘internal affairs doctrine is a major tenet of Delaware corporation law having important federal 
constitutional underpinnings.’”50  Other commentators, however, challenge the constitutional 
claim and argue that the internal affairs doctrine is simply a choice of law doctrine.51 
 Even within the United States, the principle that a corporation’s internal affairs will be 
regulated by the law of the state of incorporation is not absolute.  A few states, most notably 
New York and California, have adopted legislation that explicitly attempts to limit the scope of 
the internal affairs doctrine as applied to local corporations that are incorporated in other states.52  
These statutes are commonly described as “foreign” or “pseudo-foreign” corporation statutes. 
                                                 
43 VantagePoint. at 1116 (quoting McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987)). 
44 Tung 2006, pp. 45-46. 
45 Id. As Richard Buxbaum lucidly explains, the internal affairs doctrine began as a concept that addressed the 
power of courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations.  Buxbaum 1987.  See H.N.P., Jr. 1949, p. 666 
(“Since the middle of the last century, American courts have uniformly expressed their reluctance to entertain 
controversies arising from the ‘internal affairs’ of corporations incorporated in other states.”).  Even at this time, the 
scope of the doctrine was unclear.  As one court noted, to undertake an enumeration of when jurisdiction would and 
would not be entertained “would be a difficult and hazardous venture.” Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N.Y. 
259, 264, 109 N.E. 250, 251 (1915). 
46 See, e.g. Ribstein and O’Hara 2008 (describing debate over regulatory competition). 
47 See, e.g., Cary 1974 (claiming that issuer freedom to choose corporate law through selection of a state of 
incorporation produces a “race to the bottom”); Winter 1977 (challenging Cary’s claim and arguing that regulatory 
competition results in a “race to the top”). 
48 See, e.g., Suggs 1995, p. 1103 (“the requirements of a federal system of coequal sovereign states necessitates the 
promotion of [the internal affairs] doctrine to constitutional status”). 
49 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).  
50 Id.  See also McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216-17 (concluding that the internal affairs doctrine is 
“compelled’ by the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
51 See Rubenfeld 1988 (analyzing and rejecting arguments that the internal affairs doctrine is compelled by the 
Commerce Clause); Stevelman 2009 (“Under modern law the [internal affairs doctrine] is best understood merely as 
a choice of law regime”); O’Hara and Ribstein 2009 (asserting that the doctrine does not have “special constitutional 
status”). 
52 See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§1317-1320; Cal. Corp. Code § 2115. 
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Both the California and New York provisions have traditionally applied only to corporations that 
conduct a designated amount of business within the state. They also exclude listed or publicly-
traded companies from their scope.53   
 The justification for these statutory incursions upon the internal affairs doctrine is that 
they are consistent with conflict of law principles that authorize states to regulate firms that have 
substantial ties with the state.  For example, under standard “interest analysis” a forum state may 
apply its local law when it has a strong policy interest in doing so, despite the claim that another 
state’s law should apply.  Thus, in Havlicek,54 a California court used a conflict of laws analysis 
to determine the scope of the inspection rights of the director of a corporation incorporated in 
Delaware.  The court reasoned that “California’s interest would be more impaired by the 
application of Delaware law than Delaware’s interest would be impaired by the opposite result. 
California law applies to the inspection issue.”55   
 The Delaware courts have challenged this analysis, reasoning that the internal affairs 
doctrine is of Constitutional magnitude and, as a result, other states do not have the power to 
apply these statutes to Delaware-incorporated firms56 This dispute between California and 
Delaware remains unresolved, and may presumably be exacerbated by SB 826, which is not 
limited to corporations that conduct the majority of their operations in California.57 
 
2.2 The Scope of the U.S. Internal Affairs Doctrine 
 
In terms of scope, the internal affairs doctrine in the US has the role of policing the 
boundary between corporate law, which is dictated by the state of incorporation and other laws 
such as environmental law, labor law, consumer protection law, etc. which are determined by the 
forum state.  In addressing this objective, the key question is whether the statute or legal rule is 
directed to internal corporate constituencies or affects the interests of third parties external to the 
corporation.  As Vice-Chancellor Laster observed in Sciabacucci v. Salzberg, “the state of 
incorporation cannot use corporate law to regulate the corporation’s external relationships.”58   
How does one distinguish between internal and external relationships?  A starting point is 
differentiating between internal corporate constituencies and third parties external to the 
corporation.59  Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs explains that those internal 
                                                 
53 The extent to which foreign corporation statutes are invalid under the internal affairs doctrine is unclear and is, in 
fact, the subject of an ongoing disagreement between the Delaware and California courts.  Edwards 2010.    
54 Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Services, Inc., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1844 (Cal. App. 1995). 
55 Id. at 1853. 
56  Thus, for example in VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005). the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution prohibited California from imposing its corporate 
governance rules on companies with substantial business ties to California that were incorporated elsewhere.  
57 See, e.g., Stevens 2007 (comparing the perspectives of the courts in both states).  Absent a determination by the 
U.S. Supreme Court that the internal affairs doctrine is constitutionally compelled, it is unclear how this difference 
could be resolved. 
58 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (2018). 
59 See Rubenfeld 1988, p. 379-80 (“There can be no bright line-indeed no line at all-drawn to separate internal and 
external affairs; a corporation's internal affairs are external affairs when they implicate third-party rights”). 
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corporate constituencies are typically a corporation’s officers, directors and shareholders.60  
Consistent with the principle of shareholder primacy,61 US law provides shareholders with 
distinctive treatment relative to other corporate stakeholders.62  As the court explained in 
Salzberg, whether a forum selection bylaw dealt with an internal corporate affair was determined 
by analyzing whether the bylaw addressed the rights and powers of a stockholder “as a 
stockholder.”63  Similarly the Restatement (2d) of Conflicts of Laws defines internal affairs as 
“[m]atters . . .  which involve primarily a corporation’s relationship to its shareholders.”64 
 The fact that the statute addresses internal corporate constituencies is not enough; the 
statute must also focus on internal issues rather than external activities.65 In. Salzberg, Laster 
explained that Delaware corporate law, by virtue of the internal affairs doctrine, could regulate 
matters such as “the rights, powers, and privileges of a share of stock, determine who holds a 
corporate office, and adjudicate the fiduciary relationships that exist within the corporate 
form.”66  Jack Jacobs observed that “Illustrative examples of internal affairs include: the 
mechanics of incorporating, the election or appointment of officers and directors, the adoption of 
by-laws, the issuance of shares and bonds, the holding of directors' and shareholders' meetings, 
voting, the right to examine corporate records, corporate charter and by-law amendments, 
mergers, reorganizations, the reclassification of shares, the declaration and payment of 
dividends, and stock repurchases and redemptions.”67  
 
2.3. The Proper Scope of the Internal Affairs Doctrine 
 
We argue that, although neither courts nor commentators have developed a satisfactory 
definition of the internal affairs doctrine, the explanations and examples cited here reflect a 
common core principle: the internal affairs doctrine applies to rules governing the economic 
relationships among shareholders, officers and directors.   As such, the internal affairs doctrine is 
critically intertwined with the norm of shareholder primacy.  Similarly, we argue that rules 
addressed to issues of general social welfare and the rights of third-party stakeholders fall outside 
the parameters of the internal affairs doctrine. 68   
                                                 
60 Jacobs 2009, p. 1161 (“The internal affairs doctrine is a judge-made choice-of-law rule which mandates that 
disputes regarding ‘internal affairs’—'those matters which are peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
corporation and its … directors, officers and shareholders’ - are governed by the laws of the state of 
incorporation.”). 
61 See generally Smith 1998 (describing the shareholder primacy norm in U.S. corporate law). 
62 For example, directors and officers are accountable to shareholders alone by the constraints of fiduciary duties.  
Similarly, shareholders have the authority to elect directors and exercise voting power with respect to designated 
corporate transactions such as mergers and dissolutions.   
63 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (2018). 
64 Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, § 302, com. a, p. 307. 
65 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (2018). 
66 Id. 
67 Jacobs 2009, p. 1161.   
68 As the Supreme Court has noted, “As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally determines 
issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation. … Different conflicts principles apply, however, where the 
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We note that the considerations of predictability and fairness that are frequently cited in 
support of the internal affairs doctrine focus on the role of corporate law in protecting 
shareholder interests, and primarily shareholder economic interests, through regulation of issues 
such as shareholder voting, director duties and the process for effecting a merger.  For example, 
the fact that a corporation may have shareholders throughout the world, allowing each 
shareholder’s home country to seek to protect that shareholders interests through the application 
of local law would be highly problematic.  As the court observed in Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. 
P’ship:69 “When a public corporation such as Citigroup has shares in the market, it will have 
investors from all around the world, and certainly in virtually every state in our nation. For 
investors to be able to sue not only under federal law, but purport to sue under their own state's 
bespoke laws, subjects corporations to potential inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and unfairness.”70  
Understanding the internal affairs doctrine in terms of economic relationships provides 
critical support for the doctrine and for the regulatory competition that it facilitates.  In 
particular, in a system with efficient capital markets, share prices will respond both to the 
adoption of new legal rules and to firm-specific governance choices, but only as long as those 
rules concern investor-oriented firm value.  Regulatory competition enables corporations to 
select those states that provide efficient rules because those rules will enhance share prices.71  
The role of the capital markets is essential in preventing regulatory competition, through the 
internal affairs doctrine, from generating a race to the bottom.72  
Notably, however, the capital markets are ineffective in responding to legal rules that do 
not affect share price such as rules that affect the interests of third-party stakeholders or general 
social welfare.73  In addition, the U.S. system does not provide states with complete freedom to 
compete.  In areas in which regulatory competition is viewed as problematic, Congress, the SEC 
and the stock exchanges have the ability to intervene and to eliminate such competition by 
imposing a uniform rule.74  Similarly, regulations that focus on the protection of non-shareholder 
interests are found outside the scope of corporate law where they are similarly insulated from 
state competition. 
 
2.4 The Import of the U.S. Internal Affairs Doctrine for Centros and the EU 
 
                                                 
rights of third parties external to the corporation are at issue.” First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio 
Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983).  
69 140 A.3d 1125, 1136. 
70 Id. at 1136.  The court nonetheless concluded that these concerns did not warrant extending the internal affairs 
doctrine to the plaintiffs’ Holders Claims (claims alleging damages based on the plaintiffs’ continuing to hold stock 
in reliance on the defendant’s misstatements). 
71 See, e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel 1991. 
72 See Winter 1977, pp. 251-52. 
73 More problematically, the capital markets will not value the benefits legal rules provide to non-shareholder 
stakeholders. 
74 For example, the New York Stock Exchange requires listed corporations to have a minimum number of 
independent directors on their boards.  NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A. 
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We argue that the above historical account shows that the internal affairs doctrine as 
applied in the United States is one of economic ordering.  More specifically, the effect of the 
U.S. internal affairs doctrine has had a leveling effect akin to Centros’ effect (but in greater 
measure).  Corporate law rules in the U.S. do vary from state to state but in large measure are 
identical in both scope and principle.  The lack of significant litigation over the  internal affairs 
doctrine is testament to this harmony.  
This account and understanding of the internal affairs doctrine has import for the future 
of more substantive principles which involve issues which affect constituencies other than 
stockholders.  In order to address this issue and its impact on Centros better, we consider in the 
next section the question of whether SB 826 is directed to internal corporate affairs.  In the 
following section we consider the application of these principles to regulatory competition in 
Europe.   
 
3. The California “Women on Boards” Statute 
 
3.1 The Scope and Structure of SB 826 
 
SB 826, California’s “Women on Boards” statute illustrates the uncertain scope of the 
internal affairs doctrine.  On Sept. 30, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 826 
into law, making California the first U.S. state to require women on corporate boards of 
directors.  The statute applies to “publicly held domestic or foreign corporation[s] whose 
principal executive offices, according to the corporation’s SEC 10-K form, are located in 
California.”75    
SB 826 initially requires that corporations subject to its requirements have at least one 
female director on their boards by the end of 2019. By the end of 2021, the requirement increases 
to a minimum of two female directors for corporations with a total board size of four or five 
directors and three female directors for corporations with a board consisting of six or more 
directors.  Notably, the law does not require that women replace men who are currently serving 
as directors, but authorizes a corporation simply to add additional women directors to the board.  
Although the statute does not follow the European approach of designating that women comprise 
a designated percentage of female directors on boards,76 the structure of the statute appears to 
respond to a literature observing that the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards require 
a critical mass and that it is particularly beneficial to have at least three women directors.77   
 SB 826 was not California’s first effort to increase board diversity.  In 2013, the 
California legislature enacted a non-binding resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 62, which 
                                                 
75 Notably, neither SB 826 nor the federal securities laws provides a definition of principal executive offices.  See 
Bainbridge 2019a. 
76 France, Norway, Italy, Spain, Belgium, India and Germany have all adopted gender quotas, Zillman 2017. The 
European Commission has proposed but not adopted legislation that would impose a 40% gender quota.  Boffey 
2017. 
77 See, e.g., Kramer, et al. 2006.   
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called for all publicly-traded corporations in California to have a minimum of 1-3 women on 
their boards of directors within a timeline of three years.78  The resolution made California the 
first state in the U.S. to “take a stand on gender diversity in the boardroom” and was described as 
a “’California leads the nation’ moment.”79  Several other states adopted similar resolutions, but, 
because the resolutions were non-binding, they did not generate substantial changes in board 
diversity.  One commentator observed that, as of the end of the three-year timeframe of SCR 62, 
“approximately 20% of the firms included in the Russell 3000 Index and headquartered in 
California complied with the resolution’s targeted number of female directors.”80 
 SB 826 was enacted as part of the California foreign corporation statute.81 It differs from 
the rest of the California foreign corporation statute, however, in two critical ways.  First, as 
noted above, its application is based exclusively on the location of the corporation’s principal 
executive offices.  In contrast, the other provisions of §2115 only apply if both the corporation 
does more than half its business in the state and has more than half of its voting securities held 
by California residents.82   Second, rather than providing an exemption for publicly-traded 
corporations, SB 826 applies exclusively to such corporations. 
 The statute grants the California Secretary of State the authority to enforce the statute by 
imposing fines of $100,000 for the first violation and $300,000 for subsequent violations.83  The 
author of the legislation, California state senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, said that “she believes 
having more women in power could help reduce sexual assault and harassment in the 
workplace.”84  Governor Brown signed the Bill despite significant commentary that it could be 
unconstitutional.85  
 
3.2 SB 826 and the Internal Affairs Doctrine 
 
                                                 
78 CA Urges its Public Companies to Put More Women on Their Boards - SCR 62, 2020 Womenonboards.com, 
https://www.2020wob.com/blog/ca-urges-its-public-companies-put-more-women-their-boards-scr-62. 
79 Id. 
80 Von Meyerinck et al. 2019. 
81 See SB 826 §3 (adding §2115.5 to the California Corporation code). 
82 See §2115 (a). 
83 The statute also directs the Secretary of State to publish statistics on corporate compliance with the requirements 
as well as information on the number of corporations who move their headquarters into or out of California or that 
go private.  
84 Gov. Brown Signs Law Requiring Women on Corporate Boards, Sept. 30, 2018, CBS SF Bayarea, 
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2018/09/30/gov-brown-signs-law-requiring-women-on-corporate-boards/ 
85 See Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. to the Members of the California State Senate dated Sept. 30, 
2018, https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SB-826-signing-message.pdf. (observing that “[there] 
have been numerous objections to this bill and serious legal concerns have been raised.”).  Commentators have 
identified two principal bases on which the legislation may be vulnerable.  First, because the statute purports to 
regulate firms incorporated outside of Delaware, it may violate the internal affairs doctrine.  See Grundfest 2018.  
Second, the imposed gender quota may violate the equal protection rights conferred by both the U.S. and California 
Constitutions.  See, e.g., Amar and Mazzone 2018.  California's own legislative analysis concluded that "the use of a 
quota-like system, as proposed by this bill … may be difficult to defend.” Clark and Nakagawa 2018, p. 6.  This 
article does not consider the equal protection arguments.  
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Although commentators quickly characterized SB 826’s application to corporations 
incorporated outside of California as impermissible based on the internal affairs doctrine,86 we 
question that conclusion here.  Specifically, we ask whether SB 826 truly addresses corporate 
internal affairs. 87  At first blush, it seems like the answer to that question is obviously yes in that 
SB 826 is addressed to the composition of the board of directors, and the board of directors is 
vested with the legal authority to act for the corporation.88  Upon further reflection, however, this 
analysis appears overly simplistic.  It is not clear that any regulation that touches upon the board 
of directors is necessary a matter of corporate internal affairs.  SB does not seem to deal directly 
with the board’s role or responsibilities.  It does not address the identity of directors, the size or 
structure of the board, the manner by which directors are selected, or their power and duties.  
Unlike Dodd-Frank, it does not impose skill or knowledge requirements.89  Nor does it interfere 
with existing corporate operations or shareholder choice by disqualifying any existing members 
of the board.90   
Instead, to determine whether SB 826 regulates internal corporate affairs, it is necessary 
to interrogate whether SB 826 is directed to the corporate law objective of shareholder value 
maximization.  Toward this end, identifying California’s objectives in adopting SB 826 presents 
some challenges.  In its preamble, SB826 initially cites research that female board representation 
improves corporate performance.  Section 1 of the statute explicitly references a number of 
independent research studies that, according to the statute, find that “publicly held companies 
perform better when women serve on their boards of directors.”91 The problem with this 
justification is that it is not clear that the statute is really about improving corporate economic 
value. 
First, despite the claims in the statute, the results of empirical studies evaluating the 
relationship between female board representation and corporate economic performance have 
been “largely inconclusive.”92  Although some empirical studies have found a positive 
relationship between board diversity and economic performance,93 others have found no 
                                                 
86 E.g. Grundfest 2018. 
87 We note that such a challenge to the statute would likely occur in a California court as a defense to California’s 
effort to enforce the fines applicable under the statute to firms that fail to comply. 
88 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. §141(a) (providing that corporations are managed by or under the direction of the 
board of directors); Bainbridge 2003, p. 560 (“it is the board of directors that personifies the corporate entity”). 
89 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§951-953, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1899-904 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.§§78j-3, 78l, 78n to 78n-1). 
90 We further note that nothing in SB 826 directly conflicts with Delaware or any other state’s regulation of 
corporate boards.  Nothing in the Delaware statute, for example, addresses the topic of gender diversity or imposes a 
different threshold than the California statute.  Indeed, Delaware expressly authorizes corporations to adopt charter 
and bylaw provisions establishing director qualifications, and some corporations have done so.  See Cain et al. 2016. 
Similarly, the NYSE and Nasdaq establish mandatory thresholds for director independence, and those requirements 
are generally viewed as supplementing rather than conflicting with Delaware law. 
91 See SB 826 §1. 
92 See, e.g., Broome, et al. 2011, p. 765 (observing that “the empirical literature on corporate board diversity also 
yields largely inconclusive results.”). 
93 See, e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009 (noting better performance metrics of companies with more female directors)   
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relationship94 or even, in some cases, a negative correlation.95  Establishing a causal relationship 
is even more difficult – studies generally compare existing corporations with different levels of 
female board representation,96 but it may be the case that those companies with more female 
directors are different from their peers.97  As a result, the case that there is a causal relationship 
between board diversity and firm value simply has not been made, and it is difficult to defend the 
California statute in terms of its anticipated impact on firm economic performance.    
 Concededly empirical studies support the claim that, whether or not corporations perform 
better with more female board representation, corporations with women on boards are run 
differently, although again, the studies fail to demonstrate a causal relationship.  There is 
evidence that female board representation is associated with greater corporate social 
responsibility.98  Empirical results indicate that companies that have female directors take fewer 
risks, engage in less securities fraud, contribute more to charity99 and provide greater recognition 
of the interests of diverse corporate stakeholders.100  Even if these associations were causal, they 
would support the potential for gender diversity to enhance general social welfare rather than 
shareholder value.  Indeed, some commentators have expressly acknowledged that there is “no 
business case for—or against—appointing women to corporate boards” and that efforts to 
increase women’s representation should be based on “fairness and equality.”101 
 Second, the text of SB 826 demonstrates that a substantial motivation of the legislation 
was to address social welfare considerations.  One of these considerations is increasing the 
representation of women in positions of leadership.  As section 1 observes, despite constituting 
approximately half of the workforce, women are substantially underrepresented in positions of 
leadership in corporate America.  In 2018, women held only 17.7% of board seats on Russell 
3000 companies in the US.102 As of November 2018, half of these companies had no women 
directors or only a single woman director.103 According to ISS, only 10% of lead independent 
directors are women, and women comprise only 4% of board chairs.104  In 2018, women were 
CEOs of just 4.8% of Fortune 500 companies.105  According to some commentators, a key tool 
                                                 
94 See Rhode and Packel 2014, pp. 383-85 (reviewing empirical literature). 
95 E.g., Shehata, et al. 2017.   
96 But see Matsa and Miller 2013 (comparing firms subject to Norway’s mandatory quota with unaffected firms and 
finding lower short-term profits in affected firms).  Ahern and Dittmar document a similar impact on Tobin’s q.  
Ahern and Dittmar 2012.   
97 See Broome, et al. 2011 (noting that ”even in those studies that have been able to establish a correlation, the 
direction of causality is unclear.”). 
98 E.g., id.; Boulouta 2013; Zhang et al. 2013.   
99 See, e.g., Marquis and Lee 2013 (finding a positive and significant relationship between the “proportion of female 
board members [and] overall philanthropy.”). 
100 Again, these studies measure correlation not causation.   
101 See, e.g., Klein 2017.   
102 2018 Gender Diversity Index Key Findings, https://www.2020wob.com/companies/2020-gender-diversity-index 
103 2020 Women on Boards Reports Half of Russell 3000 Companies Lack Women Directors on Boards, IPOs Fare 
Worse, Businesswire, Nov. 8, 2018, https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181108005102/en/2020-Women-
Boards-Reports-Russell-3000-Companies 
104 Fuhrmans 2018.   
105 Stewart 2018.   
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for increasing female representation in the C-suite is by increasing the number of women on 
boards.106  Anna Berringer at Catalyst argues, for example, that “In order for boards to appoint 
more female CEOs, there first have to be more female board members to vote for them.”107  This 
observation is supported by research finding that gender diversity on boards plays an important 
role in both the appointment and success of women as CEOs.108  
 Studies also report that female board representation  is correlated with greater gender 
diversity throughout a corporation.109  Other research indicates that the presence of women 
directors is associated with better professional employment opportunities and gender equality 
practices in their corporations.110  Supporters of the California legislation justify the legislation in 
terms of creating greater opportunities for women in the workplace and leading to corporations 
with stronger corporate governance and social responsibility.111  Increasing the number of female 
corporate leaders can also be seen as a response to potential #MeToo problems, at least to the 
extent that women can influence corporate culture and promote the values of diversity and 
inclusion.112   
 We further note that the structure of SB 826 is poorly tailored to the objective of 
maximizing firm economic value.  For one thing, the statute’s jurisdictional scope is weakly tied, 
at best, to the economic interests of the state of California.  The jurisdictional reach of the statute 
is not based on the number of a corporation’s California shareholders.  Nor does SB 826 apply to 
corporations that conduct a substantial percentage of their operations in the state, provide a 
substantial number of jobs to California residents or furnish California with substantial tax or 
other revenue.  Instead, the jurisdictional hook of a corporation’s principal executive office is a 
statement about corporate leadership and visibility. Regulation of the public companies that are 
subject to SB 826 serves the California’s political objectives.  Regulating the diversity of their 
leadership is consistent with California’s reputation as a progressive leader, a role in which 
California can be particularly effective given its size and the number of businesses that operate 
within the state.113  California has frequently led the way in adopting progressive legislation, and 
other states often follow its initiatives.114  
 As such, we argue that SB 826 is better understood as promoting the interests of women 
executives, employees, and members of society and, as such, is directed to the promotion of 
                                                 
106 Carpenter 2018.  
107 Id. 
108 Cook and Glass 2015.    
109 See, e.g., Glass Lewis 2017, p. 2 (“Both theoretically and empirically, it appears that increasing female 
representation on boards begets more gender diversity throughout the organization”) 
110 De Celis, et al. 2015. 
111 SB 826, section 1. 
112 See, e.g., Levick 2018 (describing ways in which female directors can assist corporations in addressing issues of 
sexual harassment). 
113 See, e.g., Sin 2018 (identifying the perspective that the absence of women on the boards of California-
headquartered companies is disappointing given the reputation of “California as progressive and a leader on social 
issues” and that “an economy as big as California’s ought to “set an example globally for enlightened business 
practice.”) 
114 See, e.g., von Meyerinck 2019 (observing that “examples of California leadership involve renewable energy, 
sentencing reform, and legalization of marijuana usage.”). 
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societal value rather than shareholder wealth.115  This analysis challenges the traditional scope of 
the internal affairs doctrine.  Although we do not claim that protecting stakeholders is necessarily 
inconsistent with or even orthogonal to shareholder value, this objective reflects a broader 
conception of corporate purpose and corporate objectives.116  Importantly, we do not intend, in 
making this claim, to take a position as to whether these objectives are normatively desirable or 
whether it is appropriate to use corporate law to attempt to achieve the social objectives of 
diversity through board quotas.   
 Although SB 826 offers an opportunity to consider the relationship of the shareholder 
primacy norm to calls for a broader conception of corporate purpose and responsibilities, it is not 
the only such example.  Similar questions are implicated by the ongoing debate over corporate 
sustainability and ESG.117  Commentators continue to question the extent to which sustainability 
considerations affect economic performance.118  Indeed, the SEC has long opposed requiring 
sustainability disclosure as part of issuer financial reporting on the basis that it addresses issues 
that are not economically material to shareholders.119  Similarly the Department of Labor has 
cautioned public pension funds that the consideration of societal and stakeholder interests in their 
investment and governance decisions may conflict with their responsibilities to their 
beneficiaries.120    
 Some commentators have argued forcefully that non-shareholder interests are not 
properly within the purview of corporate law and should be addressed elsewhere.121  These 
positions raise questions about the extent to which state and shareholder efforts that are 
concerned with such interests should be understood to address internal corporate affairs.   
 These questions will not be confined to the legitimacy of SB 826.  Other states may 
follow California’s example and adopt board diversity requirements.122  A bill mandating both 
gender and racial diversity on corporate boards is currently under consideration by the Illinois 
legislature.123  A similar bill is already making its way through the New Jersey legislature.124  
                                                 
115 See Peirce 2018 (describing SB 826 as “embrac[ing] a stakeholder approach . . . Shareholders are mentioned, but 
the list of beneficiaries features stakeholders prominently”). 
116 Indeed, the recognition that the interests of shareholders might not be perfectly aligned with the interests of other 
stakeholders has led a number of states to adopt legislation explicitly authorizing corporate boards to consider non-
shareholder interests.  See Geczy, et al. 2015 (describing constituency statutes and examining their effect on 
institutional investors’ investment decisions).   
117 See id. (describing the California legislation as “one piece of a broader set of ideas encapsulated by the snappy 
acronym ESG”). 
118 Compare Unruh et al. 2016 (describing mounting evidence “that sustainability-related activities are material to 
the financial success of a company over time.”).with Canary 2018 (expressing skepticism that, in most cases, 
sustainability considerations are economically material). 
119 Fisch 2019. 
120 Canary 2018.   
121 See, e.g., Friedman 1970, p. 32.  See also Armour et al., 2017 (considering extent to which non-economic issues 
are beyond the boundaries of corporate law and terming such regulation “external corporate law”). 
122 As noted above, several states followed California’s prior adoption of a non-binding board diversity resolution.  
See tan __. 
123 Bainbridge 2019. 
124 Green and Vittorio 2018  
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Community leaders in Michigan are debating whether Michigan should follow suit.125  
Moreover, SB 826 may reflect a state trend not merely to regulate board diversity but to extend 
state corporate law to address a broader range of ESG issues.  State legislators are unlikely to 
limit such laws to businesses incorporated in the state. 
 Finally, the extent to which social welfare issues constitute part of a corporation’s 
internal affairs has implications for the scope of private ordering that can be effected through 
firm-specific charter and bylaw provisions.  According to a recent Delaware decision, legitimacy 
of such provisions depends in part on the scope of the internal affairs doctrine.  In Salzberg, VC 
Laster invalidated a forum selection bylaw on the grounds that, because it addressed the 
litigation of securities fraud claims brought pursuant to §11 of the Securities Act of 1933, it was 
beyond the legal bounds of a corporations’ bylaw authority under the Delaware statute.126  The 
court reasoned that a corporation’s bylaws can only address internal corporate affairs.  We note 
that some shareholders have sought to use the shareholder proposal rule to address social welfare 
issues, and the extent to which such efforts are legitimate depends in part on the scope of the 
internal affairs doctrine. 127   
 Simply put, SB 826 provides reason to reconsider the scope of the internal affairs 
doctrine.  To the extent that SB 826 reflects an extension of corporate law to address a broader 
range of interests and a more expansive conception of corporate purpose, the traditional 
justifications for deference to the law of the state of incorporation are less compelling and the 
forum state’s interests are more acute.   
Similarly, regulatory competition is less desirable with respect to issues for which the 
capital markets are poorly positioned to discipline firm choices.  SB 826 can be understood as a 
response to this problem.  If the reasons for increased board diversity are both non-economic and 
non-firm-specific, the capital markets are unlikely to encourage firms to increase board diversity 
through private ordering.  Stock prices will  reward corporations for increased board diversity (or 
punish corporations for the lack thereof) if and only if board diversity is tied to shareholder 
value.  Indeed, a recent empirical study of SB 826 finds that affected firms suffered a negative 
price effect upon the legislation’s adoption, suggesting that market participants did not view the 
statute (or similar non-economic legislation) as likely to improve the economic performance of 
those firms.128  More generally, capital market discipline might actually undermine the ability of 
corporations to use private ordering to pursue non-economic objectives through increased board 
                                                 
125 Cain 2018 (considering whether Michigan should “follow California’s lead and enact a law requiring publicly-
held corporations to have at least one female board member”). 
126 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (2018). More recently, the SEC has faced a debate over 
whether proposals seeking to adopt certain forum selection bylaws are within the scope of shareholders’ bylaw 
authority. Clayton, 2019. 
127 It is noteworthy that at least one commentator has argued that shareholder activism is a more appropriate vehicle 
for increasing board diversity than SB 826.  Grundfest 2018.  In the early 1990s shareholders sought to use Rule 
14a-8 to address board diversity.  The effort had limited success, in part because the SEC allowed issuers to exclude 
binding shareholder initiatives on the grounds that they might violate federal civil rights law.  See, e.g., In Apple 
Computer, Inc. (Oct. 15, 1992); Wang Laboratories, Inc. (Aug. 11,1992); Transamerica Corporation (Mar. 3,1992) 
and Sears, Roebuck & Company (Mar. 3, 1992). 
128 Von Meyerinck, et al., 2019. 
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diversity because, to the extent that board diversity sacrifices shareholder value in favor of the 
interests of other constituencies, the effect on stock price creates an incentive for shareholders to 
respond through their voting power.129   
 Finally, SB 826 is distinctive both because it is the first effort by a US state to mandate 
board diversity and because it represents an unprecedented effort by a state to extend its 
corporate law rules to address matters of societal rather than purely economic concerns.  As 
such, it highlights the fact that, for the most part, differences in US corporate law among the 
states are relatively small.130  Historically, even in circumstances in which a state has adopted an 
innovative provision, a number of other states are likely to follow suit.131  As a consequence, 
regulatory competition in the United States should be understood less in terms of issuer choice 
than in terms of imposing pressure toward convergence.  
 
4. Implications for EU Regulatory Competition 
 
What does this analysis tell us about the potential for regulatory competition in Europe 
after Centros?  First, it suggests that even at the time of the Centros decision, its potential impact 
in terms of enabling regulatory competition was likely overstated.  US regulatory competition is 
premised on the norm of shareholder primacy, and European corporate law does not have the 
same focus.  “[M]ost European countries have corporate laws that expressly state that the 
corporation's managers have a duty to consider all the stakeholders of the corporation, not just 
stockholders, when managing the enterprise.132  European officers and directors must manage 
their corporations in the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders and society as a whole.133  
Similarly, considerations of sustainability and ESG are an accepted component of EU corporate 
                                                 
129 Cf. Buccola 2018 (observing that the internal affairs doctrine is best understood as protecting against 
opportunistic behavior by shareholders). 
130 See Carney 1997 (demonstrating how competition has led to relative uniformity in U.S. corporate law.). 
131 For example, Delaware adopted the pioneering §102(b)(7) authorizing limits on director personal liability in the 
wake of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Del. Gen. 
Corp. L. §102(b)(7).  As Bill Carney shows, “Led by Delaware's legislature in 1986, forty-two states passed 
virtually identical legislation within eight years permitting corporate charters to elect to exculpate directors from all 
liability for negligence, while six other states either placed ceilings on liability or simply removed such liability by 
statute.”  Carney 1997, p. 734.   
132 Strine 2016.  
133 See, e.g. Hopt 1994, p. 208 ("Maximization of shareholders' wealth has hardly ever been the objective of German 
stock corporations … ."); Roe 2003 (French corporate law “is said to encourage managers to run the firm in the 
general social interest, for all the players in the firm.”); Raaijmakers  and Beckers 2015, p. 293 (the Netherlands 
“Corporate Governance Code is based on the principle that a company is a long-term alliance between the various 
parties involved in the company, such as employees, shareholders and other investors, suppliers, customers, the 
public sector and public interest groups.”). 
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responsibility,134 while in the US, the impact that such considerations should have upon 
corporate operations remains hotly debated.135   
Because of this difference in focus, the extent to which the internal affairs doctrine, at 
least as understood in US terms, would require EU states to defer to the law of a corporation’s 
state of incorporation remains unclear.  Many components of EU company law focus on 
protecting stakeholder interests or societal values.  These provisions blur the line between 
internal and external affairs and, under our theory of the internal affairs doctrine, offer a less 
compelling case for deference to the law of the state of incorporation.   
An example is the German codetermination requirement.  Germany requires corporations 
above a minimum size to provide employee representation on the corporation’s board of 
directors, with the level of such representation depending upon the number of corporate 
employees.136  For the corporations with at least 2000 employees, parity between worker and 
shareholder representatives is required.  In addition, codetermination mandates a minimum size 
for the supervisory board, again depending on company size.137 Although, as with other 
governance measures, it is difficult to analyze the relationship between codetermination and firm 
value empirically, commentators have raised questions about impact of worker representation on 
decision-making efficiency.138 In addition, studies suggest that the large board sizes, such as 
those required under codetermination, are associated with lower firm value.139 Accordingly, 
German codetermination, like SB 826, seems to be less about shareholder or economic value 
than about protecting worker and societal interests.140  Indeed, the argument was made in the 
Erzberger case that “the arrangement and conduct of German Supervisory Board elections reflect 
legitimate economic and social policy choices, which are a matter for the Member States.”141 
SB 826 also raises the issue of whether regulations concerned with the protection of 
stakeholder or shareholder interests can be better justified than economic regulation in terms of 
the home state’s interests.   Under the Restatement of Conflicts or common law interest analysis, 
a court’s choice of law may properly reflect the public policies of the local jurisdiction, and a 
state is entitled to apply local law when it has a sufficient interest in doing so.  To the extent that 
                                                 
134 See, e.g., Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and Council, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 330/1) 1, 5 (EU) 
(imposing sustainability reporting requirement); Baselli 2019 (reporting that Northern Europe is home to the leading 
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138 I.e. Davies and Hopt 2013, p. 344.  
139 Eisenberg et al. 1998; Yermack 1996. 
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codetermination rights to those workers of a German firm that were based in Germany). 
141 Keijzer, et al. 2017, p. 10. 
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EU company law is focused on protecting a broader range of interests than those of shareholders, 
a state may justifiably claim an interest in applying local law that protects those interests. 
In considering this point, it is worth noting that the European Corporation or Societas 
Europaea (SE) offers corporations a mechanism for obtaining increased flexibility and 
mobility.142  Available since the early 2000s, the SE enables corporations that operate in more 
than one European state to obtain partial relief from the differences in local law.  For German 
corporations, the SE  allows a corporation to “freeze” both the size of its board and its level of 
employee representation even if it subsequently grows to the point that it would become subject 
to higher thresholds and allows new companies to avoid the codetermination requirement 
entirely.143  Eidenmueller et al. find strong evidence that corporations use the SE to avoid 
mandatory codetermination rules.144  Although the fact that German firms have the option of 
forming an SE may appear to limit the claim that Germany has a compelling public policy 
interest in applying codetermination to local corporations, an alternative explanation is that, 
Germany also has an interest in encouraging the growth of supranational corporations and 
promoting European unity. 
Despite these advances, the degree of corporate harmonization present in the US is less 
likely in Europe, at least in the near term.  European corporate law differs among the various 
European countries to a much greater degree than US corporate law differs among the states.145  
These differences have persisted despite many years of harmonization efforts.146  Indeed, the 
ambitious European Model Company Act highlighted both the differences among jurisdictional 
approaches and the strong local policy considerations behind those differences. 147  Even on 
matters in which EU corporate law appears to have converged, differences in ownership patterns 
and institutional structures lead to significant differences in function.148 Importantly, a 
substantial component of the policy differences stem from strong nationalist identities and 
ambivalence about political integration that do not have a clear analogue in the United States.149  
As one commentator has observed, “cultural and political factors make corporate migrations 
‘less frictionless’ in Europe than in the United States, and thus reduce the level of competition 
and convergence in the field of European company law.”150 
That these differences persist despite Centros reinforces the claim that, in Europe, 
company law reaches more broadly than shareholder value and internal corporate affairs.  The 
                                                 
142 Kadi 2012; Bouloukos 2007. 
143 Davies and Hopt 2013. 
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145 See, e.g., Deakin 2006. 
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breadth of national interests continues to provide compelling motivation for member states to 
resist uniformity.  This fact is illustrated by the EU approach to company law, in which a variety 
of Directives impose mandatory norms or minimum standards but in which individual member 




Centros was viewed as a landmark decision.  At least some commentators celebrated its 
potential to provide US-style corporate regulatory competition to EU corporations via the 
internal affairs doctrine.  But this outcome has not come to fruition. Centros has served a 
levelling function with respect to some aspects of corporate law, but it has not created a market 
in corporate mobility, nor has it spurred wholesale change to corporate codes.   
This is not surprising.  In the United States, the internal affairs doctrine has had a greater 
harmonizing effect because of the role of US-style notions of shareholder primacy in shaping the 
internal affairs doctrine.  As such, we argue that in the US, the internal affairs doctrine is really a 
rule of internal ordering of shareholder economic relations.  Whether we call them corporate law 
or something else, laws like SB 826 that are primarily directed to social welfare fall outside the 
scope of a corporation’s internal affairs.  This theory is consistent with views of regulatory 
competition and efficiency that allow parties to select into their optimal governance law.   
The lack of significant harmonization in Europe is explained by the fact that significant 
parts of European corporate law, like SB 826, are really about social rather than economic 
ordering.  As such, corporate law incorporates national and societal values that individual 
corporations are unwilling to reject by incorporating elsewhere.152  German corporations, for 
example, generally accept, rather than seeking to avoid, the representation of labor interests 
reflected in codetermination.  SB 826 thus highlights the limited scope and potential for 
harmonization of corporate law in Europe. It also explains Centros’ limited effects and the effort 
to curb those effects by shifting pieces of legislation to areas explicitly outside corporate law.  
Ironically, the ultimate conclusion from this analytical journey is that -- with the adoption 
of SB 826 and the realistic prospect that other states will follow California’s lead -- the US may 
beheading more towards a European style of governance, than vice versa.  SB 826 and its effects, 
thus inform our view of Centros, but also point to a US future in which legislatures increasingly 
impose social-type legislation on US companies regardless of their state of incorporation as the 
US moves away from its historical emphasis on shareholder primacy.153  The extent to which 
such legislation can be understood as outside traditional corporate law and therefore beyond the 
limits of the internal affairs doctrine will pose a challenge for US regulatory competition. 
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